It is generally understood that effective complaint management can have a substantial impact on long-term sales and profits (Fornell and Wernefelt 1987) . As a result, the study of consumer complaining behavior has drawn considerable interest over the years both from academicians and practitioners. Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran (1998) have demonstrated that effective service recovery can have a positive impact on consumer trust and commitment. Other researchers have shown that effective complaint handling not only enhances the likelihood of repurchase and limits the spread of potentially damaging negative word of mouth (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993) , it can also lead to positive word of mouth and goodwill (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995) . Those companies that have managed to successfully address customer complaints can attest to the impact on financial performance (e.g., FedEx, WalMart, Hampton Inns).
Although prior research has greatly increased our understanding of complaint behavior, most studies have focused solely on complainants or on noncomplainants. For example, Smith and Bolton (1998) examined dissatisfied customers' reactions to service failure and recovery efforts, and Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran (1998) and Blodgett, Hill, and Tax (1997) investigated complainants' subsequent perceptions of justice and its consequences. Whereas these researchers focused solely on dissatisfied customers who did complain (i.e., to the retailer or service provider), Stephens and Gwinner (1998) studied the cognitive-emotive processes of dissatisfied consumers who did not voice their complaint to the seller. Each of these studies has provided valuable insight into a critical aspect of complaint behavior; however, none provides researchers and practitioners with a rich, descriptive overview of the broader complaining behavior process. Given the managerial significance of this topic, it would be usewould help researchers and practitioners to better understand how different consumers respond-and why-when dissatisfied with a product purchased at a retail store. This type of information could, in turn, help retail practitioners develop policies and procedures to recover from customer dissatisfaction more effectively.
The primary purpose of this research is to develop a Bayesian network model of the consumer complaining behavior process. The developed model emphasizes explanation and prediction of customer responses after experiencing dissatisfaction with a product purchased at a retail store. The outputs of the Bayesian network-conditional probabilities-are easily interpreted by a wide audience. Importantly, the conditional probability outputs provide managers with the capability to predict future behavior and to ask diagnostic "what if" questions based on assumed marketing actions. Building on earlier work by Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters (1993) ; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran (1998) ; Smith and Bolton (1998) ; Singh (1990) ; and others, the complaining behavior process is presented, distinguishing between (a) dissatisfied consumers who do not seek redress (noncomplainers), (b) dissatisfied consumers who do seek redress and subsequently experience a high level of justice (satisfied complainants), and (c) dissatisfied consumers who seek redress but subsequently perceive a lack of justice (dissatisfied complainants). The repatronage intentions and subsequent word-of-mouth behavior (both negative and positive) of these three categories of dissatisfied customers are examined. By distinguishing among noncomplainers, satisfied complainants, and dissatisfied complainants this study provides researchers and retail managers with a richer, more comprehensive understanding of the determinants and outcomes of the complaining behavior process.
The article begins with an overview and a conceptual model of the complaining behavior process, followed by a discussion of the data and measures available for quantitative modeling. A brief discussion of Bayesian networks is then followed by the development of a Bayesian network of the complaining process and probabilistic inference applications. The article concludes with comparisons with alternative causal modeling methods and a discussion of new insights provided by the model and limitations.
THE PROCESS OF COMPLAINING BEHAVIOR Overview
Because the theoretical framework on which the study of complaining behavior is built has been adequately discussed by other authors (see Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; Singh 1988 Singh , 1990 Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) , it will not be presented in detail in this article. Rather, this section will present a brief overview of the complaining behavior process and will discuss the key variables that are included in the model. Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters (1993) characterize complaining behavior as a dynamic process; that is, as a series of related events, much like a decision tree. Having experienced dissatisfaction, some customers choose to seek redress from the retailer (i.e., ask for a refund, exchange, or repair), whereas others do nothing (Stephens and Gwinner 1998) . This initial complaint decision is of considerable importance to retailers because of its impact on subsequent customer behavior. Prior research has found that dissatisfied consumers who choose not to seek redress (i.e., noncomplainers) might instead "get even" (Folkes 1984) by telling others about their dissatisfaction and by discontinuing or limiting future patronage at that store (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995) . The more successful retailers have found that it is beneficial to encourage dissatisfied customers to seek redress, because these customers (i.e., complainants) provide retailers the opportunity to address and remedy the problem. Prior research has demonstrated that the subsequent behavior of complainants is dependent, in large part, on their perceptions of justice (i.e., their overall evaluation of the retailer's response to their complaint). Complainants who perceive that justice was served (i.e., the customer receives a fair settlement and is treated with courtesy and respect) might subsequently increase their patronage and might engage in positive word of mouth, thus creating goodwill. However, if justice is not served, complainants are likely to become even more angry, to engage in negative word of mouth, and to exit (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993; Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) .
A major factor that influences the decision to seek (or not seek) redress is the perceived likelihood of success (Day and Landon 1976; Richins 1983b) . Likelihood of success refers to the customer's perception of the retailer's willingness to remedy the problem without a hassle (Hirschman 1970) . Another important factor is one's attitude toward complaining. Attitude toward complaining refers to an individual's disposition to seek redress when dissatisfied with a product or service (Bearden and Mason 1984; Richins 1987) . Some consumers are assertive (Richins 1983a) and will seek redress whenever they are dissatisfied, whereas others are reluctant to complain even when highly dissatisfied. Folkes (1984) has shown that dissatisfied customers also will assess whether the problem is stable and whether the problem was controllable. Stability refers to the perception that similar problems occur frequently at the offending retail store (and will continue to occur in the future), whereas controllability attributions indicate that the customer believes that the 322 JOURNAL OF SERVICE RESEARCH / May 2000 problem could have been prevented (but was not). Stability and controllability both indicate, to some degree, incompetence or a lack of concern by the retailer. When problems are seen as being stable or controllable, dissatisfied customers are less likely to seek redress.
The decision to seek (or not seek) redress results in a branch in the complaining behavior process (see Figure 1) . Because noncomplainers do not voice their dissatisfaction to the retailer, they-by definition-cannot experience justice (or a lack thereof). Therefore, their subsequent word-of-mouth behavior and repatronage intentions are determined by the same personal and situational variables that influenced their decision not to seek redress. Complainants, on the other hand, offer retailers the opportunity to provide redress (and thus recover from customer dissatisfaction). Having voiced their complaints to the retailer, complainants' subsequent word-of-mouth behavior and repatronage intentions are based largely on their perceptions of justice. Prior research indicates that perceived justice has three components: (a) Distributive justice (Homans 1961) refers to the fairness of the remedy offered by the retailer, (b) procedural justice (Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975) is an evaluation of the fairness of the policies and procedures used in arriving at the outcome, whereas (c) interactional justice (Bies and Moag 1986; Bies and Shapiro 1987) reflects the manner in which the customer is treated (i.e., rude vs. courteous) during the redress process.
The Process Model
The complaining behavior process is shown in Figure 1 and includes the following components: store type, store loyalty, stability/controllability, attitude toward complaining, likelihood of success, the redress decision, perceived justice, repatronage intentions, and word-of-mouth behavior (both positive and negative).
In the complaining behavior process, store loyalty and store type are hypothesized to influence the perceived likelihood of successful redress. Store loyalty is based on prior experience (Kelly and Davis 1994; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) and in this context reflects the individual's preference for shopping at the offending retail store prior to the dissatisfying purchase experience. Higher levels of store loyalty are the result of prior positive experiences with the store (see Smith and Bolton 1998) and indicate higher levels of trust. Given dissatisfaction, customers who have higher levels of store loyalty should therefore perceive a higher likelihood of success. Store type is a situational variable that indicates whether the initial dissatisfaction was due to a product purchased at a discount store, a department store, or a specialty store. The inclusion of this variable was based on the observation that discounters (led by Wal-Mart) have been more aggressive in promoting liberal return policies-in an attempt to positively address customer complaints-than have department stores or specialty retailers. Based purely on intuition, it is posited that dissatisfied customers will be more likely to perceive a high likelihood of success when the focal product was purchased at a discount store. Two other variables that potentially influence the likelihood of success are attitude toward complaining and stability/controllability. According to dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) , people have an underlying need to maintain cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors that are consistent with one another. To maintain consistency, consumers who are reluctant to complain-and hence do not seek redress-might further justify their lack of action by reasoning that there was little likelihood of success. Similarly, it is expected that dissatisfied customers who perceive the problem to be stable or to have been controllable also will perceive a lower likelihood of success. Believing that the retailer was aware of the problem (i.e., because it was stable or controllable) but did nothing to remedy it in the first place, the dissatisfied customer is more apt to believe that the retailer is unlikely to subsequently provide redress.
As previously discussed, likelihood of success, attitude toward complaining, and stability/controllability are hypothesized to directly influence the redress decision. Researchers consistently have reported that dissatisfied consumers who perceive a high likelihood of success are more likely to seek redress from the offending retailer (e.g., Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995; Richins 1983b Richins , 1987 Singh 1990 ). Prior research also has found that customers with a positive attitude toward complaining are more likely to seek redress (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995) and that stability and controllability affect the type of redress preferred (Folkes 1984) . Thus, attitude toward complaining and stability/controllability are hypothesized to have both direct and indirect effects (i.e., through likelihood of success) on the redress decision.
As shown in Figure 1 , the redress decision results in a branch in the complaining process. Once a dissatisfied customer seeks redress, subsequent repatronage intentions and word-of-mouth behavior are influenced by the complainant's perception of justice (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993; Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) . However, if redress is not sought, perceived justice is a null event and has no bearing on subsequent intentions and behavior. (Because justice is a postcomplaint evaluation, the distinction between complainers and noncomplainers is critical in modeling the complaining behavior process.) Last, repatronage intention is hypothesized also to be dependent on store loyalty and stability/controllability. Loyal customers, and those who perceive the problem to be neither stable (and thus not likely to happen again) nor controllable (and thus not the fault of the retailer), should be more willing to give the retailer a "second chance" (Smith and Bolton 1998) and thus repatronize the store.
METHOD Data
Data were collected via a self-report questionnaire from 502 respondents who had experienced dissatisfaction with a product purchased at a retail store within the past 12 months. Some respondents were solicited via campus mail at two large universities (one midwestern, one midsouthern), whereas others were approached via mall intercept. Complaints centered on a wide variety of products (including clothing, shoes, toys, cameras, jewelry, and small appliances) purchased at a wide variety of retail stores. A product value of $200 or less was used as a sample selection criterion to provide a more homogeneous sample in terms of cost. This decision resulted in 459 cases available for analysis. The 459 respondents were predominantly female and spanned a wide range of ages, income, and educational levels. The race and occupational status of the respondents was fairly representative of the overall U.S. population. See Appendix A for a more detailed demographic profile of the sample.
Measures
Multiple-item scales were used as indicators of the constructs ATTITUDE, LOYAL, STABCON, LOS, and JUS-TICE (see Appendix B). The majority of the items were taken directly from Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters (1993) and were measured using 7-point Likert-type scales. As per Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters, perceived justice was modeled as a global variable, encompassing the distributive, interactional, and procedural components, and thus reflected a complainant's overall perception of justice. All of the scales exhibited acceptable reliability (e.g., all alphas were above .70).
Application of a discrete Bayesian network required creation of categorical variable representations of constructs from the measured indicators. These categorical representations were accomplished by applying a k-means cluster analysis to the set of observed measures associated with the construct. For example, the variables V1, V2, and V3 (see Appendix B) were standardized and then clustered based on nearest centroid sorting (Anderberg 1973) to construct the variable labeled ATTITUDE. The k-means cluster analysis approach was selected over other numerical taxonomy construction methods because (a) the method tends to produce groups that are clearly differentiated by profile mean levels, (b) discriminant classification functions (Green 1979) can easily be estimated and used for the classification of future measured profile values into categories, and (c) computational programs are readily available. A binary classification was selected for each 324 JOURNAL OF SERVICE RESEARCH / May 2000 construct to avoid problems in estimation of conditional probabilities from multidimensional tables and to facilitate interpretation. As a result, attitude toward complaining (ATTITUDE), store loyalty (LOYAL), likelihood of success (LOS), stability/controllability (STABCON), and perceived justice (JUSTICE) were each operationalized using two categories, "low" and "high." The descriptive profiles of the resulting measures are given in Appendix C. As previously mentioned, store type was operationalized using three categories: discount (e.g., Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target), department (e.g., Sears, JCPenney, Goldsmiths), and other (e.g., The GAP, The Limited, and other regional or local specialty stores).
The dependent variables (redress seeking, repatronage intention, and word of mouth) also were measured using categorical scales. The redress decision variable (RE-DRESS) had two categories: "did seek redress" and "did not seek redress." Of course, dissatisfied customers who did not seek redress did not have measurements on perceived justice (JUSTICE). Thus, to provide a complete data representation for JUSTICE, a third category was added to denote the noncomplainers and was labeled "null." The three repatronage intention categories (RE-PAT) were "no repatronage" (these respondents indicated that they would not shop at the offending retailer for any kind of product), "limited repatronage" (these respondents indicated that they would still shop at the offending retailer; however, they would not buy the same type of product at that store), and "full repatronage" (these respondents indicated that they would continue to shop at that retailer in the future and would not hesitate to buy any kind of item at that store). Word-of-mouth behavior (WOM) also had three categories: "negative word of mouth," "no word of mouth," and "positive word of mouth." Respondents were asked whether they told anyone else about their experience and, if so, whether the purpose of these conversations was to complain about the retailer (negative WOM) or whether they were praising the retailer (positive WOM).
BAYESIAN NETWORK FOR THE COMPLAINING BEHAVIOR PROCESS Bayesian Networks
Causal modeling can be viewed as a two-stage process of model specification and parameter estimation. Model specification is based primarily on theoretical considerations, with the major tasks of (a) establishing a set of variables to represent the theoretical content, (b) assigning the assumed temporal ordering of the variables, and (c) asserting the cause and effect relationships. A model is termed as recursive if its graph contains no double-headed arrows and has no feedback loops or cycles. An arrow or directed edge in the graph of a recursive model, called a directed acyclic graph, represents the conditional probabilistic dependence of a successor variable on a predecessor variable (or parent). A theoretical basis for model specification in connection with graphical representations is provided by Dawid and Lauritzen (1993) .
A recursive causal model specification has the following parts (Pearl 1996): 1. the set of model variables, V = {V 1 , . . . , V m }, 2. the set of mutually independent unobserved variables that represent unspecified disturbances, U = {u 1 , . . . , u m }, 3. the probability function for each element in U, p(u i ), 4. a proper subset of V not containing V i , PA i (connoting parents) that is assumed to be the set of direct causes of V i , and 5. a set of functions, each having the form
A directed acyclic graph of a recursive causal model, coupled with a conditional probability function for each model variable, is a form of probabilistic model called a Bayesian network (Pearl 1988) or influence diagram (Howard and Matheson 1981; Shachter 1986) . Each node in the network represents a random variable that can take on two or more possible values. The arrows indicate the existence of assumed direct effects between linked variables, and conditional probabilities quantify the strength of these influences. Unlike a linear equation, which assumes continuous measurement and expresses each variable as a function of its direct predictors and an error term, there are no variable error terms in a Bayesian network. Instead, the probability distribution of each effect is expressed solely as a function of direct predictors (the parents) with uncertainty resulting from p(u i ).
The major strength of Bayesian networks is that probabilistic inference can be made directly from the conditional probabilities p i (v i |pa i ). This type of inference is based on knowledge of the direct causes from model specification and the assumption of independence of the u i disturbance terms, without further assumptions concerning the distributions p(u i ) or the functional form of the f i s. Probabilistic inference requires calculation of the joint probability distribution of model variables from the product of the conditional probabilities (Kiiveri and Speed 1982) ,
The decomposition of the joint probability distribution into a product of the appropriate elements of the condiBlodgett, Anderson / CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 325 tional probability functions provides the ability to estimate a probability distribution for a set of query variables given realizations of a set of evidence variables, p(Query*Evidence). Any set of variables in the network can serve either as a query or as evidence. The conditional probabilities in the Bayesian network are used to compute joint probability distributions for any set of query variables with fixed values of the evidential variables. In general, the conditional probability of any query variable in state q given evidence can be found by
The state of an evidence variable is assumed known with certainty and is often termed an instantiated variable. Instantiation of a variable or a set of variables allows prediction or forward inference, from causes to effects, and diagnostics or backward inference, from effects to causes. The Bayesian name is attached to a recursive probabilistic model because backward inference is accomplished by application of Bayes' theorem. The mechanism of probabilistic inference is often called propagation of evidence, or just simply propagation. Although both Gaussian probability models and discrete probability models are well developed conceptually, computational abilities for practical implementation are currently available only for the discrete situation.
Model Specification
The model specification for the complaining behavior process of Figure 1 requires nine model variables, V = {STORE, LOYAL, ATTITUDE, LOS, STABCON, RE-DRESS, JUSTICE, REPAT, WOM}, nine disturbance variables representing unspecified causes, U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 , u 7 , u 8 , u 9 }, and the following causal assertions:
The specification treats store type (STORE), LOYAL, ATTITUDE, and STABCON as independent variables with the uncertainty of their states due to the unspecified causes u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , and u 4 . The direct causes of LOS are these four independent variables plus an unspecified cause u 5 . The decision to seek REDRESS is caused by ATTITUDE, STABCON, LOS, and u 6 . The low, high, and null states of JUSTICE are a result of REDRESS and u 7 . Repatronage intention (REPAT) is caused by LOYAL, STABCON, JUSTICE, and u 8 . Finally, WOM is caused by JUSTICE, REPAT, and u 9 .
The query process requires selecting the evidential variables and specifying the states assumed known with certainty. Probabilities are computed for nonevidential variables based on the selected instantiation of the evidence. The computations necessary for queries require joint probabilities, as a specialization of Equation 2, based on the model specification,
The conditional probabilities of Equation 5 are estimated from the data and stored in the Bayesian network.
RESULTS

Quantifying the Network
The network was specified from the complaining process given in Figure 1 and quantified from the data provided by the 459 respondents. The Bayesian network was formed by the Bayesian Knowledge Discoverer program (Ramoni and Sebastiani 1998) and provided the conditional probabilities necessary for diagnostics and prediction. The Bayesian network has nine conditional probability tables consistent with Equation 5. The tables without measured parents are small, as LOYAL, ATTI-TUDE and STABCON have only 2 values each, and STORE has 3 values. However, conditional probability tables for REDRESS, JUSTICE, and WOM have 16, 6, and 27 values, respectively, and LOS and REPAT each have 72 values. Thus, the network is not displayed.
Statistical testing of the causal links postulated by Equation 4 was conducted, under the assumption of multinomial distributions, with the Build module of TETRAD II (Scheines et al. 1994) . The tests of independence and conditional independence yielded significant likelihood-ratio chi-squared statistics, at the .05 level, for all links except the STABCON→REDRESS edge. The p value for this 326 JOURNAL OF SERVICE RESEARCH / May 2000 link was .08, and the edge was retained in the model. (Please note that the assumption of multinomial distributions is not necessary for probabilistic inference.)
Prior Probabilities
Probabilistic inference starts with the unconditional or prior probabilities shown in Figure 2 . Prior probabilities provide a simple description of the data and can be used as a baseline comparison with model-derived conditional probabilities. For example, the prior probabilities reveal that 45% of the 459 respondents perceived a low likelihood of success, whereas 55% perceived a high likelihood of success. Forty six percent of the respondents did not seek redress, and for the 54% that did seek redress, 76% perceived a high level of justice. Similarly, 51% of all respondents engaged in negative word of mouth, 19% engaged in positive word of mouth, and 30% did not engage in any word of mouth. Forty-two percent of the respondents indicated full repatronage intentions, 53% indicated limited repatronage intentions, whereas only 5% intended to completely exit. Other prior probabilities can be interpreted in a similar fashion.
Probabilistic Inference
Causal relationships, quantified by conditional probabilities, provide an enhanced understanding of the complaining behavior process. Tables 1 through 4 contain the conditional probabilities obtained for the causal relationships specified in the model. Figures 3, 4 , and 5 use these outputs to summarize the complaining behavior process of noncomplainers, satisfied complainants, and dissatisfied complainants, respectively. Table 1 reveals that loyal customers, and those with a positive attitude toward complaining, are more likely to perceive a high likelihood of success. The conditional probability that a loyal customer (LOYAL = high) will perceive a high likelihood of success is .65 as compared to .40 for customers who are not particularly loyal to the retailer (LOYAL = low). Similarly, the probability that a customer with a positive attitude toward complaining (ATTITUDE = high) will perceive a high likelihood of success is .66 as compared to .39 for those customers who typically are reluctant to complain (ATTITUDE = low). Interestingly, Table 1 shows that discount stores have been more successful in conveying a high likelihood of success than have department stores and other types of retailers. The probability that a customer who is dissatisfied with a product purchased at a major discount store (STORE = discount) will perceive a high likelihood of success is .70 compared to .55 for department stores and .46 for other types of stores. Last, in Table 1 it can be seen that stability/controllability had a moderate effect on likelihood of success. Dissatisfied customers who perceived the problem to be neither stable nor controllable (STABCON = low) had a slightly greater probability of inferring a high likelihood of success than Effects of predecessors on redress. Table 2 displays the effects of likelihood of success, attitude toward complaining, and stability/controllability on the redress decision. When dissatisfied customers perceive little likelihood of success (LOS = low), the probability that they will indeed seek redress from the retailer is only .30. However, when dissatisfied customers perceive a high likelihood of success (LOS = high), the probability that they will seek redress increases to .74. Similarly, the conditional probability that someone with a negative attitude toward complaining (ATTITUDE = low) will actually seek redress is only .33, whereas the probability that a dissatisfied customer who has a positive attitude toward complaining (ATTITUDE = high) will subsequently seek redress is .71. Compared to these two variables, the effect of stability/controllability on the redress decision is not as pronounced. When a dissatisfied customer perceives that the problem is neither stable nor controllable (STABCON = low), the probability of redress is .59; however, in those situations in which a dissatisfied customer perceives that the problem is stable and/or could have been prevented (STABCON = high), the probability of redress decreases only slightly, to .46. Table 3 reports the influence of justice on the repatronage intentions of noncomplainers, satisfied complainants, and dissatisfied complainants. Figures 3, 4 , and 5 combine the conditional probabilities of "full" repatronage (as reported in Table 3) , with the corresponding probabilities of "limited" repatronage and "exit" intentions for each of the three groups. From Table 3 , it can be seen that the conditional probability of full repatronage intentions for noncomplainers (JUSTICE = null) and dissatisfied complainants (JUSTICE = low) is only .25 and .28, respectively, whereas the probability of full repatronage intentions for satisfied complainants (JUSTICE = high) is .67. Figure 3 further illustrates that the probability of limited repatronage intentions for noncomplainers is quite large (.71), whereas the probability of exit intentions for this group is quite small (.04). Figure 4 indicates a moderate probability of limited repatronage intentions for satisfied complainants (.32) and almost zero probability of exit intentions (.01). Finally, although dissatisfied complainants have a high probability of limited repatronage intentions (.58), Figure 5 reveals that this group has a higher probability of exit intentions (.14) than the other two groups. Table 3 also reports the influence of loyalty and stability/ controllability on full repatronage intentions. Dissatisfied customers who are loyal (LOYAL = high) had a higher probability of full repatronage intentions (.50) than did dissatisfied customers who are not loyal (.33). Similarly, dissatisfied customers who felt that the problem was neither stable nor controllable (STABCON = low) had a greater probability of full repatronage intentions (.49) than those who thought the problem could have been prevented and/or was stable (.33). Table 4 reveals the influence of justice on the negative word-of-mouth behavior of noncomplainers, satisfied complainants, and dissatisfied complainants. As shown in Table 4 , the conditional probability of negative word of mouth for noncomplainers (JUSTICE = null) and dissatisfied complainants (JUS-TICE = low) is quite high (.72 and .67, respectively), whereas the probability of negative word of mouth for satisfied complainants (JUSTICE = high) is substantially lower (.22). Figures 3, 4 , and 5 combine the conditional probabilities of negative word of mouth with the corresponding probabilities of "no" word of mouth (or "none") and "positive" word of mouth for each of the three groups. Figure 3 illustrates that the probability of no word of mouth for noncomplainers is small (.28) and that the probability of positive word of mouth for this group is zero (.00). As shown in Figure 4 , the conditional probability of positive word of mouth for satisfied complainants (.46) outweighs the corresponding probability of no word of mouth (.32). Dissatisfied complainants (see Figure 5 ), on the other hand, have zero probability of positive word of mouth (.00) and only a moderate probability of no word of mouth (.33). Table 4 also reveals an inverse relationship between repatronage intentions and negative word-of-mouth behavior. Dissatisfied customers who report full repatronage intentions have only a .31 probability of engaging in negative word of mouth as compared to .65 for dissatisfied customers who intend to limit their repatronage and .66 for those who intent to exit.
Effects of predecessors on LOS.
Effects of predecessors on repatronage intentions.
Effects of predecessors on WOM.
Relative Strength of Predecessor Variables
To more readily compare the impact of the various predecessor variables on LOS, REDRESS, REPAT, and WOM, additional analyses were performed, resulting in the influence, range, and importance scores listed in Tables 1 through 4. The influence of a predecessor variable in a given state (e.g., high or low) was calculated as the difference between the conditional probability, p(dependent variable|predecessor), and the prior probability of the dependent variable, p(dependent variable). Thus, the influence is the change in probability from an unconditional state to a conditioned state of the dependent variable. The range score is a measure of total influence and is calculated as the sum of the absolute influences of the two most extreme states of the predecessor variables. The relative importance of a predecessor variable was determined by computing and rescaling the ranges to yield normalized indexes (i.e., that sum to 100).
The influence, range, and importance of the predecessors of LOS = high are shown in Table 1 . Given that the prior probability of LOS = high was .55, and taking into consideration the prior probabilities listed in Table 1 , the largest positive influence of a predecessor in a given state was STORE = discount (.15), followed by ATTITUDE = high (.11). The largest negative influences were ATTI-TUDE = low (-.16) and LOYAL = low (-.15). After rescaling the ranges, the order of relative importance of the predecessor variables was ATTITUDE, LOYAL, STORE, and STABCON, with indexes of 31, 29, 27, and 13, respectively.
The influence, range, and importance of the predecessors on REDRESS = yes are listed in Table 2 . Taking into account the prior probability for REDRESS = yes (.54) and the conditional probabilities, the predecessor state having the largest positive influence was LOS = high (.20), followed by ATTITUDE = high (.17). Likewise, the largest negative influences were LOS = low (-.24) and ATTI-TUDE = low (-.21). Based on the range of the influences, the order of relative importance of the predecessors was LOS, ATTITUDE, and STABCON, with normalized indexes of 46, 40, and 14. Table 3 reports the influence, range, and importance of LOYAL, STABCON, and JUSTICE on REPAT = full. Based on the prior probability of REPAT = full (.42), and the conditional probabilities listed in Table 3 , the largest positive influence was JUSTICE = high (.24). Conversely, the largest negative influence was JUSTICE = null (-.17). After normalizing the ranges, the order of importance was JUSTICE, LOYAL, and STABCON, with indexes of 55, 23, and 22. Table 4 displays the influences, range, and relative importance indexes for WOM = negative. After taking into account the prior probability of WOM = negative (.51), the largest influences were JUSTICE = high (-.29), JUSTICE = null (.21), and REPAT = full (-.20) . Given the ranges of the two influences, the relative importance of JUSTICE was 59 as compared to 41 for REPAT.
Backward Inference Capabilities
The previous analyses employed forward probabilistic inference, from predecessor/parent (cause) to dependent variable (effect). Backward inference (from effect to cause), by application of Bayes' theorem, is also useful for diagnostic purposes. For example, Table 5 provides conditional probabilities of JUSTICE and REPAT given each of the states of WOM. The state JUSTICE = null (which is equivalent to REDRESS = none) had a prior probability of .46; however, the conditional probability of JUSTICE = null given WOM = negative was .66. Thus, when negative WOM occurred, the probability that it was attributed to a noncomplainer (who did not seek justice via redress) increased by .20. Likewise, given that the prior probability of REPAT = full was .42, the conditional probability that positive WOM originated from a satisfied complainant was .75, an increase of .33 over the prior probability of this particular behavior. All other probabilities displayed in Table 5 have similar interpretations.
Prediction and Intervention
The propagation of observed or assumed evidence (e.g., based on hypothetical marketing actions) provides the basis for prediction. The resulting instantiations of causal variables allow for prediction and comparisons of outcomes across various customer profiles.
To illustrate how a researcher or practitioner might use these "what if" capabilities, several interventions were performed. Accordingly, Table 6 displays the effects of changes in the prior probabilities of loyalty and attitude on full repatronage intentions and negative word-of-mouth behavior. Interventions 1 through 4 are based on the assumption that a department store undertakes actions to influence customer attitudes and to build store loyalty (e.g., through a more liberal return and exchange policy; by training frontline employees to be more helpful and friendly). As shown in Figure 2 , more favorable attitudes and higher levels of store loyalty should increase the likelihood of success. A higher likelihood of success, combined with more favorable attitudes, then results in a greater probability that a dissatisfied customer will seek redress. If the department store can then ensure a high level of justice for these redress seekers, improvements are possible in repatronage intentions and word of mouth.
The first intervention shown in Table 6 provided the baseline for department stores, p(STORE = department) = 1. The figures shown in the column under Intervention 1 indicate that the conditional probabilities for department stores are nearly identical to the prior probabilities for the sample as a whole. In the second intervention, attitude toward complaining was set to the "high" state-that is, p(ATTITUDE = high) = 1-thus causing p(LOS = high) to increase from .55 to .65, p(JUSTICE = high) to increase from .41 to .53, p(REPAT = full) to increase from .42 to .47, and p(WOM = negative) to decrease from .51 to .45. Intervention 3 set store loyalty to the high state-that is, p(LOYAL = high) = 1-causing p(LOS = high) to increase to .65, p(JUSTICE = high) to increase to .44, p(REPAT = full) to increase to .50, and p(WOM = negative) to decrease to .48. The fourth intervention manipulated the probability of perceived justice. When justice is assumed to be at the high level-that is, p(JUSTICE = high) = 1-the p(REPAT = full) increases to .67 and the p(WOM = negative) decreases to .21. These interventions illustrate how a department store could estimate the impact of various actions that might be taken to manage the complaint recovery process more effectively. Similar analyses could be undertaken for discount stores or specialty stores.
Intervention in a current process described by the Bayesian network also may be modeled in the context of an expert system (Spiegelhalter et al. 1993) . One potential intervention is to assume that external actions will result in 332 JOURNAL OF SERVICE RESEARCH / May 2000 a different conditional probability distribution of an existing directed edge. Whereas it is unrealistic to assume that actions of department stores could result in an ideal state-such that p(ATTITUDE = high) = 1, p(LOYAL = high) = 1, or p(JUSTICE = high) = 1-it is reasonable to assume that marketing actions can at least improve the current prior probabilities. Accordingly, Intervention 5 illustrates what might be achieved if marketing actions resulted in changes in the prior probabilities from .55 to .80 for p(ATTITUDE = high), from .56 to .65 for p(LOYAL = high), and the joint probability of p(REDRESS = yes, JUS-TICE = high) increased from .76 to .90. Under these conditions, p(REPAT = full) would increase from .42 to .50, and the p(WOM = negative) would decrease from .51 to .43. Other interventions could be evaluated for various probabilities of ATTITUDE = high, LOYAL = high, and JUS-TICE = high to estimate the effect of assumed marketing actions on repatronage intentions and word-of-mouth behavior (negative and positive).
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Alternative Causal Models
Two alternative quantitative methods for causal modeling are structural equation models and partial least squares. To better illustrate the unique attributes of Bayesian networks (and thus demonstrate why the complaining behavior process is best modeled in this manner), the linear structural equations and partial least squares methodologies will be described briefly with the possible application to the complaining behavior process of Figure 1 . The advantages and limitations of Bayesian networks will be discussed vis-à-vis these two, better known methodologies.
Structural equation models.
The statistical common factor model, coupled with path analysis, provides the foundation for structural equation modeling. The model represents structural variables as latent variables, assumed to have the characteristics of normally distributed random variables. Each measured variable is viewed as a function of a latent variable representing the theoretical construct and an error factor that reflects the influence of unspecified factors and random disturbances. Estimation, usually based on the maximum likelihood criterion, centers on two types of parameters-regression weights and covariances-derived from the set of linear equations implied by the path analysis of measured and latent variables. The parameter estimates are combined to yield a covariance matrix for measured variables as implied by the structure of measurement and structural assertions. The value of the discrepancy function, determined from the differences between the implied covariance matrix and the sample covariance matrix, is the basis for statistical and descriptive evaluations of overall model fit.
Results are presented in regression terminology, such as validity coefficients, standardized path coefficients, measurement equation R 2 s, and structural equation R 2 s. The major vehicle for interpretation of results is an analysis of direct and indirect standardized effects, which reflects potential changes in standard deviation units. However, the models have linear predictive capabilities only at the latent variable level. The assumption of a common factor and disturbances as the causes of measured variables precludes any prediction at the observed level due to factor-score indeterminacy.
Structural equation models often are described as most appropriate for theory testing and explanation. However, the majority of theory explanation comes from the model specification tasks of defining and ordering variables and asserting cause-effect relationships that are perquisite to all causal models. The testing and explanation contributions of a quantitative method generally are limited to the evaluation of measurement adequacy employing psychometric methods, assessment of the model adequacy using significance testing and fit indexes, and parameter estimation to reflect the magnitude of causal influence. Structural equation models do excel in measurement adequacy evaluations and in providing measures of model fit. But acceptance of the results as an appropriate representation of reality requires acceptance of the common factor theory as well as the conditions of linearity and normality. Unfortunately, even with acceptance of the validity of the assumptions, testing of overall model fit is not a test of a unique model but of a class of observationally equivalent models (Breckler 1990; MacCallum et al. 1993 ).
There are two major problems in portraying the complaining behavior process of Figure 1 by linear structural equation modeling. First, two models would be necessary, one for complainants and one for noncomplainants, due to "incomplete" data on perceived justice (which is an evaluation of the retailer's response to the complaint). We believe that a selected methodology should describe the modeled process as closely as possible rather than modify the presentation of the process to accommodate the method. Thus, a two-model representation is less adequate than the portrayal of the process with a unified model. Second, the complaining behavior process is best represented by a mixture of variables. The assumptions of linearity and normality are not reasonable for the ordinal variables REPAT and WOM and the nominal variable REDRESS. Furthermore, the invention of multiple indicators, based on pseudo-interval scales, is not appropriate for representing these concepts. Finally, we recognize that it would be possible to assume that each nominal and ordinal variable is a crude measurement of an unobservable continuous vari- Blodgett, Anderson / CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 333 able and estimate polychoric correlations as the input for analysis. However, this increase in complexity to accommodate the requirements of a model, rather than to enhance the explanation of the process, is not desirable.
Partial least squares.
A group of data-analytic devices that apply path analysis to weighted sums of directly measured variables is collectively referred to as partial least squares (Lohmöller 1989) . Application of partial least squares has been called "soft modeling" because variable measurement and distribution assumptions are not made (Wold 1980) . The technique divides the measured variables into non-overlapping blocks, each indicative of a single construct. The variables within a block are used to calculate a principal component score to measure the represented construct. The term partial least squares reflects an iterative procedure in which model parameters are partitioned into estimable subsets of observed and instrumental variables. The algorithm begins by forming a weighted composite sum, scaled to zero mean and unit variance, within each block of observed variables. Next, instrumental variables are constructed as sums of directly connected composites. Regression weights, to be used in weighted composite sums of the next iteration, are then determined by least squares procedures. The iteration terminates when the weights become stable. The final weights are applied to the measured variables to form scores to be used as model variable measurements in the least squares estimation of the structural path coefficients (Lohmöller 1989; McDonald 1996) .
Given that the distribution of the model variables is unspecified, evaluation of results is based on descriptive measures rather than on statistical tests. The adequacy of measurement is assessed by the size of the communalities of the measured variables, which measures the proportion of variance shared by a measured variable and the related component score. Construct equation R 2 s are the central indexes for evaluation of causal strength. "Jack knifing" also is available for estimation of the standard deviations of structural coefficients. The root mean square of the covariances of the measured variable residuals and the component score residuals provides an overall measure of variance not accounted for by model relationships. Thus, results are expressed in regression and factor analysis terminology.
Because the component scores are a weighted function of measurements (with results expressed in standardized units, or in the measured scale units), the partial least squares method can be used for linear prediction. However, because measurement errors are not modeled, it is expected that the magnitude of the relationships will be attenuated. The major problem with applying partial least squares to the complaining behavior process is the need for two models rather than one, as discussed with structural equation models. Also modeling REPAT and WOM as dummy variables would be awkward and potentially problematic for interpretation.
Comparison with Bayesian networks. Bayesian networks are nonparametric models; thus, no functional form or variable distribution assumptions are necessary for probabilistic inference. Results are valid for nonlinear functions and for any probability distribution of disturbances. Partial least squares models are nonparametric in terms of distribution but assume linear relationships between all model variables, whereas structural equation models are parametric in both distribution and function, assuming normality and linearity. Furthermore, Bayesian networks can accommodate decision branches, such as the redress decision, which cause incomplete data. Both structural equation and partial least squares methods require multiple models to reflect decision branches.
Bayesian networks do not currently include latent variables; therefore, all probabilistic inference is conducted at the observed level. When measurements are combined to form a categorical variable, it is a relatively simple manner to use scoring functions, such as Fisher's discriminant functions, to classify any given profile into the derived variable for purposes of prediction. The partial least squares method also permits a transformation of observed measurements into scores that may be used for prediction. However, structural equation models assume that each observed measurement is caused by latent variables. Thus, prediction based on observed measurements is not possible.
The most important advantage of a Bayesian network over alternative models is that both forward and backward inferences are possible. Forward inference can address prediction questions by allowing managers to assess probable outcomes based on assumed actions undertaken by a firm, whereas backward inference can address profile questions, such as "What is the probability that a lost customer was loyal?" or "What is the probability that a noncomplainer perceived a low likelihood of success?" Both structural equation and partial least squares models offer traditional measurement and statistical outputs that are meaningful within a theoretical context but are difficult to quantify in managerial terms. We conjure that categorical measures are more consistent than latent variables with how managers process information and that probabilities are more easily understood than standardized regression weights.
There are several limitations or weaknesses of Bayesian networks that also should be understood. Computationally, exact inference in a Bayesian network requires summing over an exponential number of terms; therefore, a relatively large sample size is necessary for useful results. Various algorithms have been developed, however, 334 JOURNAL OF SERVICE RESEARCH / May 2000 that reduce the dimensionality of the computational problem and provide approximate probabilities (Heckerman and Wellman 1995) . Second, even with large samples, the power of the statistical tests is somewhat lower when using discrete variables. However, the magnitude of power differences between variables measured on quasi-continuous scales versus categorical scales is not known. Furthermore, categorical measurement may have more intuitive appeal than component scores or hypothetical variables but may not always capture enough detail of the underlying theoretical constructs being studied or adequately reflect conditional dependency or independency.
Substantive Insights Regarding Complaining Behavior
The Bayesian network model of the complaining behavior process provides new insights that should be of particular interest to practitioners and academicians. First of all, contrary to popular belief, most noncomplainers, as well as most dissatisfied complainants, do not intend to exit. The probability that a noncomplainer will completely exit as a result of a dissatisfying purchase experience is only .04 (see Figure 3) . Rather, most noncomplainers simply intend to limit their purchases at the offending retailer (.71 probability). Despite their dissatisfaction, some noncomplainers even intend to fully repatronize the retailer (.25 probability)! Figure 5 shows that dissatisfied complainants also are reluctant to completely exit. For these particular customers, the probabilities of limited repatronage intentions (.57) and full repatronage intentions (.28) are much greater than the probability of exit (.14). These findings indicate that complete switching behavior (see Keaveney 1995) usually occurs only after multiple dissatisfying experiences and that the magnitude of the effect of customers' prior experiences with the retailer may be greater than previous studies have indicated (see Smith and Bolton 1998) . These findings are at odds with prevailing notions that exit is a common response of dissatisfied retail customers and with previous research that implies the same.
The model also revealed a high probability (.46) of positive word of mouth among satisfied complainers (see Figure 4 ). This finding indicates that successful complaint resolution may result in goodwill that extends beyond the complainants themselves (i.e., to friends, relatives, coworkers, etc.). Although prior research has alluded to this possibility (e.g., Hart, Heskett, and Sasser 1990) , proof of this beneficial outcome of the complaining behavior process has been lacking. This study provides strong, empirical evidence that post-redress positive word of mouth can (and does) occur, which in turn may attract other potential customers to the retailer. This finding lends support for the existence of the "service recovery paradox" (McCollough and Bharadwaj 1992) , which postulates that a formerly dissatisfied customer may end up being more loyal as a result of successful complaint handling.
Another interesting finding is that discount stores appear to be more successful at recovering from dissatisfaction than department stores and specialty stores. By guaranteeing satisfaction, and thus reducing the potential monetary risk associated with a purchase, it appears that discount retailers may have gained a competitive advantage over their rivals. Although many department stores and other retailers have adopted similar policies, it appears that discounters have been more successful in promoting and implementing complaint recovery policies and procedures.
Limitations and Future Research on Complaining Behavior
Although the process of Figure l does provide managers with a more comprehensive view of the complaining behavior, it by no means is meant to be complete. Other potentially important variables (such as the degree of local retail competition, whether the problem was attributed to the retailer or a manufacturer, cumulative satisfaction, customer delight, commitment, and trust) were not included in the process. Future research could build on the current study and investigate the impact of additional variables. For the sake of parsimony, this study also did not specify the three dimensions of perceived justice individually. Additional research could assess the probabilities of repatronage and word of mouth (positive and negative) given different combinations of high and low levels of distributive, interactional, and procedural justice. Researchers also might investigate and expand on the concept of limited repatronage. Although the current study indicates that limited repatronage is a common complaint outcome, the extent to which different customers intend to limit their repatronage is not known. Some customers may intend to reduce their patronage only slightly, whereas others may switch the majority of their business to competing retailers. Having established the prevalence of limited repatronage, studies also might investigate how many dissatisfying experiences customers are willing to tolerate before they completely exit. At the same time, research also can determine whether a partially damaged relationship (resulting in limited repatronage) can ever be completely restored and, if so, how many positive experiences are required to return the customer to full repatronage. Finally, future studies also might begin to build sales and profit figures into the model. By incorporating figures for annual purchases both prior and subsequent to the complaint episode, researchers could begin to better estimate the cost of losing (full or partially) different types of customers (e.g., loyal Blodgett, Anderson / CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 335 and nonloyal) and the long-term benefits of retaining complainants. Such a model also could help practitioners analyze the profitability of different marketing actions designed to influence the complaint process.
Summary
A network representation of a process, such as that depicted in Figure 1 , has two major purposes: to provide an understanding of how a process "works" and to provide a format for prediction. A network allows qualitative expression of assumed direct dependencies that imply causality without a methodology prescription for obtaining numerical estimates. Thus, if prediction and profiling of customer responses, rather than theory explication, is the focus of interest, a discrete Bayesian network would seem to be appropriate.
The Bayesian network revealed new insights as to the conditional probability of different complaint outcomes (e.g., full vs. limited repatronage vs. exit intentions). Researchers and practitioners can use this type of model to estimate the impact of proposed marketing actions and complaint recovery efforts on key determinants and outcomes of the complaining behavior process. 
